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Making Circumstantial Proof of
Distribution Available
Robert Kasunic∗
In a recent case that made national headlines, Capitol Records
and a number of other record companies sued Jammie Thomas, a
single mother from Brainerd, Minnesota, for copyright
infringement of numerous sound recordings that resided on her
computer.1 Much of the press coverage focused on the fact that
this was the first record company law suit against an individual to
go to a jury.2 Making the case even more newsworthy was the
jury’s award of $222,000 against Thomas for the twenty-four
sound recordings found to have been infringed.3 Given that these
songs could have been purchased lawfully for under twenty five
dollars, some claimed that the award was disproportionate to the
harm.4 But the jury award was not the only newsworthy event in
the trial.
A PDF version of this article is available online at http://law.fordham.edu/publications/
article.ihtml?pubID=200&id=2816. Visit http://www.iplj.net for access to the complete
Journal archive.
∗
© Robert Kasunic 2008. Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University Law School and
the Washington College of Law at American University; Principal Legal Advisor, United
States Copyright Office. Nothing in this article expresses the views of the United States
Copyright Office. Thanks to David Carson, Jane Ginsburg, and Jessica Litman for their
thoughtful comments.
1
See Complaint for Copyright Infringement, Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, No. 06CV-1497, 2006 WL 1431921 (D. Minn. Apr. 19, 2006).
2
See, e.g., Posting of David Kravets to Wired Threat Level Blog, RIAA Jury Finds
Minnesota Woman Liable for Piracy, Awards $222,000, http://blog.wired.com/
27bstroke6/2007/10/riaa-jury-finds.html (Oct. 4, 2007, 17:34 EST).
3
See id. Apparently, it took the jury only five minutes to reach this decision of willful
infringement, but it then spent another five hours on the proper amount of the damage
award. See Posting of David Kravets to Wired Threat Level Blog, RIAA Juror: ‘We
Wanted to Send a Message’, http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2007/10/riaa-juror-wew.html (Oct. 9, 2007, 13:17 EST).
4
In fact, the defendant alleged that the amount of the award was unconstitutional. See
Defendant’s Motion for New Trial, Or In the Alternative, for Remittitur, Thomas, No. 06-
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There was another controversy created by the testimony of
Jennifer Pariser, an attorney at Sony Music, who stated that
“‘[w]hen an individual makes a copy of a song for himself, I
suppose we can say he stole a song,’” and that “[m]aking ‘a copy’
of a purchased song is just a nice way of saying ‘steals just one
copy.’”5 Whether ripping songs from a CD that had been lawfully
purchased onto a hard drive constituted an infringing act became
the subject of much controversy.6 An article published in the
Washington Post attacked the record companies for changing their
tune on ripping.7 Whereas the record companies had previously
stated that it was “great” to rip songs for use on portable devices
like iPods8 they were now calling it “stealing.”9 The president of
the Recording Industry Association of America (“RIAA”), Cary
Sherman, explained the not-so-subtle distinction that arose in the
Thomas case by stating that ripping for personal use is acceptable
in most cases, but ripping to a hard drive that contains peer-to-peer
(P2P) software, such as the KaZaA software installed on Jammie

CV-1497, 2007 WL 4586690 (D. Minn. Oct. 15, 2007). The Plaintiff opposed the
motion. See Plaintiffs’ Response in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for New Trial, or
in the Alternative, for Remittitur, Thomas, No. 06-CV-1497, 2007 WL 4586692 (D.
Minn. Nov. 8, 2007). The government also filed a brief supporting the constitutionality
of the statutory damage provisions of the Copyright Act. See Pike and Fischer Internet
Law and Regulation, http://www.ilrweb.com/viewILRPDF.asp?filename=virgin_thomas_
071203USBrief (last visited Mar. 1, 2008).
5
Eric Bangeman, Sony BMG’s Chief Anti-Piracy Lawyer: “Copying” Music You Own
is “Stealing”, ARS TECHNCIA, Mar. 1, 2008, http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/
20071002-sony-bmgs-chief-anti-piracy-lawyer-copying-music-you-own-is-stealing.html.
6
See Marc Fisher, Download Uproar: Record Industry Goes After Personal Use,
WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 2007, at M05, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/12/28/AR2007122800693.html.
7
Id.
8
An archived version of frequently asked questions on the RIAA’s website, available
at the Internet Archive, states in response to the question “What is your stand on MP3?”:
If you choose to take your own CDs and make copies for yourself on
your computer or portable music player, that’s great. It’s your music
and we want you to enjoy it at home, at work, in the car and on the
jogging trail. But the fact that technology exists to enable unlimited
Internet distribution of music copies doesn’t make it right.
Ask the RIAA, Internet Archive, http://web.archive.org/web/20070516072606/
http://www.riaa.com/issues/ask/default.asp#stand (last visited Apr. 7, 2008).
9
Fisher, supra note 5 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Thomas’ computer, is a different matter.10 Songs ripped to hard
drives containing P2P software are not personal copies, because
those digital files are available to all other P2P users.11 In that
manner, another newsworthy issue was born.
The “making available” of a file, whether it is an authorized or
unauthorized copy, on a hard drive connected to a peer-to-peer
network was claimed, by the record companies, to be an
infringement of the copyright owner’s exclusive right of
distribution.12 The law on this point was far from clear.

10

Talk of the Nation: Rip This, and Sue That?, (NPR.org audio archive of debate
between Marc Fisher and Cary Sherman), available at http://www.npr.org/
blogs/talk/2008/01/rip_this_and_sue_that.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2008).
11
This distinction begs the question of whether ripping for personal use is
“noninfringing.” Record companies have claimed that ripping is an “unauthorized” use,
but unauthorized uses may be noninfringing uses if they are outside the scope of the
copyright owner’s rights or if an applicable exemption applies. Ripping, involving
converting a file within a CD into another format on a user’s hard drive, is also known
more generally as “space-shifting” for personal use. There is no explicit exemption for
the reproduction involved in ripping. While the Audio Home Recording Act contains an
exemption for noncommercial personal recording in 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (2006), the use of
a computer and a hard drive takes this activity outside of the scope of that exemption.
Ripping may therefore be deemed as a tolerated use under certain circumstances, even
though it is technically infringing. See, e.g., Tim Wu, Tolerated Uses, 32 COLUM. J.L. &
ARTS (forthcoming 2008). A tolerated use is in part based on the choice of the copyright
owner and in part a normative principle. But what is the status of the use if copyright
owners change their mind? To use a phrase from Jessica Litman (made in relation to
other uses): “Purists may want to claim that they’re illegal, but if they tried to take that
principle to court, they would lose.” Jessica Litman, Billowing White Goo, 32 COLUM.
J.L. & ARTS (forthcoming 2008).
12
17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000) states:
Subject to sections 107 through 122 [17 U.S.C. §§ 107–22], the
owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and
to authorize any of the following: . . . (3) to distribute copies or
phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other
transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending.
Article 6 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty and Article 8 of the WIPO Performances and
Phonograms Treaty require member countries to provide similar rights. The Copyright
Treaty states: “Authors of literary and artistic work shall enjoy the exclusive right of
authorizing the making available to the public of the original and copies of their works
through sale or other transfer of ownership.” WIPO Copyright Treaty, art 6, Dec. 20,
1996, available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wct/trtdocs_wo033.html.
The
Performances and Phonograms Treaty similarly states: “Performers shall enjoy the
exclusive right of authorizing the making available to the public of the original and
copies of their performances fixed in phonograms through sale or other transfer of
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Traditionally, the distribution right has required proof of the
transfer of a copy of a work in order for infringement to be
established.13 Only one appellate decision has clearly based its
holding on the theory of “offering to distribute” in the absence of
proof of actual distribution.14

ownership.” WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, art. 8, Dec. 20, 1996,
available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wppt/trtdocs_wo034.html.
13
See 2 MELVILLE NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.11[A](2005)
(“Infringement of this right requires the actual dissemination of either copies or
phonorecords.”) [hereinafter NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT]. Nimmer also points out in a
footnote that actual authorization may result in a finding of secondary liability, and
states: “But note that an offer to distribute copies or phonorecords to the public may in
itself constitute a ‘publication,’ while the right of distribution apparently is not infringed
by the mere offer to distribute to members of the public.” Id. at § 8.11[A] n.2 (citation
omitted). See also 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 5.5.1 (2002) (“The crux of the
distribution right lies in the transfer, not the receipt, of a copy or phonorecord.
Consequently, someone who simply buys or otherwise acquires a copy or phonrecord
does not violate the distribution right. Further, an actual transfer must take place; a mere
offer of sale will not violate the right. Actionable transfers include not only sales and
other dispositions of title, but also ‘rental, lease, or lending.’”) (citations omitted); 4
WILLIAM PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 13:9, 13:12–13 (2007) (“[W]hile the mere
offering to sell copies of a novel to bookstores for subsequent sale to customers
constitutes publication due to the statutory definition of publication, without actual
distribution of copies of the work, there is no violation [sic] the distribution right. The
emphasis on copies is statutorily based: the right granted is not to distribute the work, but
rather, to distribute copies of the work, that is material embodiments, seen in the
definition of ‘copies.’”) (citations omitted).
14
See Hotaling v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 118 F.3d 199, 203 (4th
Cir. 1997). The court stated:
The Hotalings assert that the Church’s libraries infringed
their copyrights by distributing unauthorized copies of their works to
the public. The libraries did not record public use of the microfiche.
Consequently, the Hotalings concede that the record does not contain
any evidence showing specific instances within the limitations period
in which the libraries loaned the infringing copies to members of the
public. But, they argue that proving the libraries held unauthorized
copies in their collections, where they were available to the public, is
sufficient to establish distribution within the meaning of the statute.
The Church, on the other hand, argues that holding a work
in a library collection that is open to the public constitutes, at most,
an offer to distribute the work. In order to establish distribution, the
Church argues, the evidence would need to show that a member of
the public accepted such an offer.
On this issue, we agree with the Hotalings. When a public
library adds a work to its collection, lists the work in its index or
catalog system, and makes the work available to the borrowing or
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The “making available” issue arose in the Thomas case when it
came time to draft the jury instructions. Judge Michael J. Davis
sought the views of counsel on the proper instructions for
infringement of the distribution right.15 The recording industry’s
attorney, Richard Gabriel, argued that the distribution right
encompasses the “making available” of a work. In making this
point, he cited a letter from Marybeth Peters, the Register of
Copyrights, written to Representative Howard Berman.16

browsing public, it has completed all the steps necessary for
distribution to the public. At that point, members of the public can
visit the library and use the work. Were this not to be considered
distribution within the meaning of [17 U.S.C.] § 106(3), a copyright
holder would be prejudiced by a library that does not keep records of
public use, and the library would unjustly profit by its own omission.
Id. The posture of this Fourth Circuit decision was a motion for summary judgment, and
the court’s determination appeared to be influenced by particular facts, e.g., (1) the
statute of limitations barred consideration of prior evidence of reproduction and
distribution, and (2) the defendant did not keep records of actual lending for particular
works. Id. at 204–05.
15
See Eric Bangeman, Debate Over “Making Available” Jury Instruction as Capitol v.
Thomas Wraps Up (Updated), ARS TECHNICA, Oct. 4, 2007, http://arstechnica.com/
news.ars/post/20071004-debate-over-making-available-jury-instruction-as-capitol-vthomas-wraps-up.html. One of the first courts to assess the “making available” argument
was a California district court in Judge Marilyn Hall Patel’s Memorandum Order on the
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment in the long-running Napster litigation and
Napster’s successors in interest. In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., 377 F. Supp. 2d 796,
802–05 (N.D. Cal. 2005). In that order, Judge Patel discussed Hotaling and responded to
the question of whether indexing file names in the Napster server was sufficient to
infringe the distribution right. Judge Patel stated: “to the extent that Hotaling suggests
that a mere offer to distribute a copyrighted work gives rise to liability under section
106(3), that view is . . . inconsistent with the text and legislative history of the Copyright
Act of 1976 . . . .” Id. at 803. She also stated: “There is no dispute that merely listing a
copyrighted musical composition or sound recording in an index of available files falls
short of satisfying these ‘actual dissemination’ and ‘actual transfer’ standards.” Id. at 802.
Further, in distinguishing Hotaling, Judge Patel stated that Napster never had the
unauthorized works in its collection. Id. Finally, in addressing the argument that the
legislative history of the Artists’ Rights and Theft Protection Act of 2003 (“ART Act”)
demonstrated Congress’s intent to equate distribution with “making available,” Judge
Patel stated: “If Congress wanted to make clear that the distribution right was broad
enough to encompass making a work available to the public without proof of actual
distribution, it was perfectly capable of doing so.” Id. at 804.
16
Plaintiffs’ Response in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings at 6, Atl. Recording Corp. v. Njuguna, No. 4:06-CV-02341-CWH (D.S.C. Nov.
15, 2007), available at http://www.ilrweb.com/viewILRPDFfull.asp?filename=
atlantic_njuguna_071115MotDisComplaintOppos. The letter was written in response to
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Ultimately, Judge Davis instructed the jury on what became Jury
Instruction Number 15: [t]he act of making copyrighted sound
recordings available for electronic distribution on a peer-to-peer
network, without license from the copyright owners, violates the
copyright owners’ exclusive right of distribution, regardless of
whether actual distribution has been shown.17
The jury found that Ms. Thomas infringed the distribution right
as it was defined by the court, and assessed monetary damages
based on her willful infringement of twenty-four songs. The jury
appeared to want to send a message to the defendant; one juror
stated that Thomas “lied” and that “[h]er defense sucked.”18
In addition to the Thomas case, a number of courts have been
grappling with the question of whether the distribution right
extends to merely “making [a work] available” online.19 This
a question by Representative Berman about an assertion made in written testimony by
Gigi Sohn, on behalf of Public Knowledge, for the Subcommittee on Internet, Courts and
Intellectual Property’s hearing on “Piracy of Intellectual Property on Peer-to-Peer
Networks.” That testimony stated that U.S. copyright law does not give copyright
owners a separate exclusive right of “making available.” While this is obviously true by
examining 17 U.S.C. § 106, the question is whether the distribution right includes an
offer to distribute. The Register responded:
In the case of a peer to peer network user uploading a copyrighted
work onto his or her computer, making it available for other users of
the peer to peer network to download, it is simply incorrect to suggest
that the person performing the download is the only person legally
responsible for infringement. Making the work available in this
context constitutes an infringement of the exclusive distribution right,
as well as the reproduction right (where the work is uploaded without
the authorization of the copyright holder).
Id. at 6–7. In the Ninth Circuit’s decision in A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., the
court held that “Napster users who upload file names to the search index for others to
copy violate plaintiff’s distribution rights.” 239 F.3d 1004, 1014 (9th Cir. 2001). It’s
worth noting that the Register’s letter specifically included the term “uploading” which is
unclear in the context used. Similarly, the Ninth Circuit also included “upload” as a
decisive activity, but did so in the context of uploading file names to a search index. Cf.
supra text accompanying note 15 (discussing Judge Patel’s later memorandum order).
17
Jury Instructions at 18, Capitol Records v. Thomas No. 06-CV-1497, 2007 WL
2826645 (D. Minn. Oct. 1, 2007).
18
Posting of David Kravets to Wired Threat Level Blog, RIAA Juror: ‘We Wanted to
Send a Message,’ http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2007/10/riaa-juror-we-w.html (Oct.
9, 2007, 13:18 EST).
19
See, e.g., Brief for Electronic Frontier Foundation as Amicus Curiae in Opposition of
Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Atl. Recording Corp. v. Howell, No. CV06–
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dispute about “making available” begs the question—is it
necessary in order to prove infringement of the distribution right?
Are there other avenues of proof that avoid a conflict with the
statutory language?
Having taught law students the fundamentals of copyright
infringement for many years, I have always instructed them that
copyright infringement may be proven by direct or by
circumstantial evidence. After making a prima facie showing of
ownership of a valid copyright (which may be presumed from a
registration of the work within five years of publication), a plaintiff
must then prove “copying” by the defendant. I’ve told students
that courts’ use of the term “copying” is really shorthand for a
violation of any of the exclusive rights. That was clearly true in
regard to direct evidence. If a defendant admits violating any
exclusive right, or there is a witness to the infringing act, such
direct evidence will be prima facie proof of the plaintiff’s direct
claim of infringement. But is this true for circumstantial evidence?
Can circumstantial evidence be used to prove infringement of the
distribution right?
As we have been told by courts on numerous occasions,
circumstantial proof of “copying” may be proven by
demonstrating: (1) access to the work by defendant, or a
reasonable possibility that the defendant could have perceived the
work, and (2) probative similarity between the two works.20 These
factual inquiries, if proven, allow the court or the jury to proceed to
the mixed question of law and fact—whether there is “substantial
similarity” between the two works or whether there has been an
improper appropriation of copyrightable elements of the plaintiff’s
work. It is obvious from the articulation of the requirements of
02076 (PHX) (NVW), 2007 WL 2409549 (D. Ariz. Aug 20, 2007), available at
http://www.eff.org/files/filenode/atlantic_v_howel/EFF_amicus_atlantic_howell.pdf. For
a dispute on this issue that precedes the Thomas instruction, see Defendant’s Reply
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss Complaint, Elektra Entm’t Group v.
Barker, No. 05-CV7430, 2008 WL 857527 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2008).
20
There are, of course, variations on this Second Circuit analysis first articulated in
Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946), such as the intrinsic/extrinsic test first
articulated in Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonalds Corp., 562 F.2d
1157 (9th Cir. 1977). For purposes of this discussion, it is unnecessary to enter the
debate on the optimal test.
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proof through circumstantial evidence that it accommodates the
reproduction right, but these inquiries—access and probative
similarity—do not substantiate infringement of the distribution
right. First, the distribution right may be infringed without a
violation of the reproduction right. Second, proof of infringement
of the distribution right entails additional elements. Based on the
language of § 106, the exclusive right of distribution involves a
distribution of copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to
the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental,
lease, or lending. Some form of distribution must be proven and
not just any distribution, but a public distribution. Proof that a
copy or phonorecord of plaintiff’s work was unlawfully distributed
is an element of the claim, but distribution cannot be proven by
access or probative similarity alone.
We know that direct evidence may be preferred, because it
provides more certainty and is much easier for lawyers to present
in court. However, circumstantial evidence is a valid form of
proof if it is relevant.21 It would seem that anything that can be
proven by direct evidence could also be proven by sufficient
circumstantial evidence.
The rationale for use of circumstantial evidence to prove
infringement of the reproduction right is the absence,
unavailability, or limited availability of direct evidence of copying.
In cases where the defendant will not admit copying and there is no
witness to the act of reproduction, the use of circumstantial
evidence may be the only option for proof of infringement of the
reproduction right. Moreover, even an element of circumstantial
proof of infringement, e.g., access, can be proven by circumstantial
evidence if there is no direct evidence of access. For instance,
access may be proven by showing a reasonable relationship and the
customary practice in a chain of intermediaries,22 the widespread
availability of a work in an area in which the defendant could
reasonably have viewed or heard the work,23 or by striking
similarity.24 Without resort to circumstantial evidence, most
21
22
23
24

FED. R. EVID. 402 (“All relevant evidence is admissible . . . .”).
See, e.g., Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens, Inc., 241 F.3d 350 (4th Cir. 2000).
See, e.g., ABKCO Music Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd, 944 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1991).
See, e.g., Arnstein, 154 F.2d 464.
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copyright infringement claims of the reproduction right would be
impossible. We now seem to find ourselves in a similar situation
with the distribution right. But why has the law not addressed
this?
Direct evidence of infringement of the distribution right was
usually not problematic given that in order to violate this exclusive
right, the distribution has to be “to the public.” The public nature
of this exclusive right was typically transparent—someone gave
and someone received. Often, such a distribution occurred on a
large scale and there might be many recipients who could directly
substantiate how they received a copy and from whom. However,
this was not always the case. The situation in Hotaling v. Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints25 is a case in point. Although
the book was publicly “available,” the absence of an admission or
a witness who saw the copy of the work being borrowed negated
the opportunity of direct proof.26 Moreover, in Hotaling, the
absence of records retained by the library documenting who
borrowed particular books was noted with concern by the court.27
It would appear that such a record would constitute circumstantial
evidence of distribution—it leads to the inference that if the record
exists, the book was actually borrowed by the patron listed.28
Proof by circumstantial evidence also appeared to be suggested
by the Ninth Circuit in Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc. when
the court characterized the Hotaling and A&M Records, Inc. v.
Napster, Inc. decisions as holding that “the owner of a collection
of works who make them available to the public may be deemed to
have distributed copies of the works.”29 This concept of “deemed
25

Hotaling v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day-Saints, 118 F.3d 199 (4th Cir.
1997).
26
Id. at 204.
27
Id.
28
Thus the Fourth Circuit was faced with a situation in which it was clear that the
defendant library had unlawfully reproduced the work and distributed that work in the
past, yet those claims were barred by the statute of limitations. There was no admissible
direct evidence relating to the unlawful copy that was not time-barred and no
circumstantial proof available that led to an inference of distribution. The court appears
to have strained to find a theory on which to find what it considered a just result.
29
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1162 (9th Cir. 2007) (emphasis
added) (citing Hotaling, 118 F.3d 199 and A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. 239 F.3d
1004 (9th Cir. 2001)).

KASUNIC_042808_FINAL

1154

5/5/2008 12:28:43 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 18

distribution” appears to be virtually identical to circumstantial
evidence of distribution. The Ninth Circuit did not appear to
embrace “making available,” in and of itself, as a violation of the
distribution right. The Ninth Circuit noted that the district court’s
conclusion on distribution—“that distribution requires an ‘actual
dissemination’ of a copy”—”is consistent with the language of the
Copyright Act.”30
The court further added that deemed
distribution applies only where a work can be deemed to have been
communicated to other computer users or where “the owner of a
collection of works who makes them available to the public may
be deemed to have distributed copies of the works.”31
“Deem” is a verb that is defined as “to judge or consider
something in a particular light.”32 Synonyms of “deem” include
“suppose,” “reason,” “judge,” or “consider.”33 Synonyms for
“suppose” are to “presume,” “assume,” “deduce,” or “infer.”34 All
of these definitions and synonyms lead to the unmistakable
conclusion that the Ninth Circuit was articulating a doctrine of
inferential distribution. “Making available” can be an evidentiary
component of circumstantial evidence of distribution even if it is
not found to constitute direct evidence of distribution.35
30

Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1162.
Id.
32
MSN ENCARTA DICTIONARY, available at http://encarta.msn.com/dictionary_/
deem.html.
33
MSN ENCARTA THESAURUS, available at http://encarta.msn.com/thesaurus_/
deem.html.
34
Id.
35
As this article was going to press, a thoughtful 52-page opinion on a motion to quash
was handed down in London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1-4, No. 04-CV-12434 (D. Mass.
Mar. 31, 2008), available at http://www.eff.org/files/filenode/riaa_v_people/LondonSire%20v%20Does.pdf. Judge Gertner held that infringement of the distribution right
does require proof that a distribution actually took place, but that a court “can draw from
the Complaint and the current record a reasonable inference in the plaintiffs’ favor—that
where the defendant has completed all of the necessary steps for a public distribution, a
reasonable fact-finder may infer that the distribution actually took place.” Id. at 26.
Thus, there is express judicial support in this decision for circumstantial proof of
infringement of the distribution right. The opinion is also notable for the similarities and
differences from an opinion of Judge Karas on the same day in Elektra Entm’t Group v.
Barker, No. 05-CV7430, 2008 WL 857527 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2008). Like Judge Karas,
Judge Gertner rejected the argument that § 106(3) included an independent right “to
authorize” distribution, finding that “to authorize” was included in § 106 to cover
secondary liability and requires an infringing act to occur after the authorization. London31
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So what would comprise a circumstantial case of infringement
of the distribution right? We would need to identify facts or
circumstances that would indicate that it is more likely than not
that an unauthorized public distribution occurred. One inferred act
of infringement of the distribution right for any particular work
would lead to a prima facie case of liability. For multiple statutory
damage awards, sufficient proof of infringement of multiple works
and/or proof of willfulness would also be required.36
Although an offer to distribute a work in some form does not
prove that a copy was actually distributed, an offer to distribute
would be relevant information about whether a distribution could
have occurred. For example, placing a work within a folder on a
computer that offers the contents of that folder to other users of a
peer-to-peer network would demonstrate that distribution to many
people was possible, and may have been desired. Not only would
this fact establish the reasonable possibility of distribution, but it
would establish that the distribution could have been to a wide
Sire Records, at 21; see also Elektra, 2008 WL 857527, at *9–10. Both Judge Gertner
and Judge Karas also limited the significance of the Hotaling precedent. Judge Karas
stated that the Fourth Circuit was “apparently motivated by equitable principles” and
stated that the great majority of courts have stopped short of endorsing the making
available right. Elektra, 2008 WL 857527, at *6–7. Judge Gertner’s characterization of
Hotaling went further. Judge Gertner stated that there is “a lacuna in the Fourth Circuit’s
reasoning” and that completing “the steps necessary for distribution does not mean that
distribution actually occurred. It is a ‘distribution’ that the statute plainly requires.”
London-Sire Records, at 23–24 (citation omitted). Where Judge Karas and Judge Gertner
disagree is on the relationship between the distribution right and the statutory definition
of “publication” contained in 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). Judge Gertner found that the two
terms are not congruent and that while all distributions to the public are publications, “not
all publications are distributions to the public—the statute explicitly creates an additional
category of publications that are not themselves distributions.” London-Sire Records, at
25. She concludes: “Plainly, ‘publication’ and ‘distribution’ are not identical.” Id. at 26.
Judge Karas came to the opposite conclusion, finding that distribution and publication are
congruent. Elektra, 2008 WL 857527, at *4–6. Yet, Judge Karas “hesitate[d] in equating
this avenue of liability with the contourless ‘make available’ right proposed by the
Plaintiff.” Id. at *6. Judge Karas held that a Plaintiff seeking to use the offer to distribute
prong of the definition of publication, must also fulfill the further pleading requirement of
alleging that the offer to distribute was for the purpose of further distribution, public
performance or display. Id. at *8. It would appear that even if plead properly, the
Plaintiff would have the obligation of proving such an allegation. It is hard to conceive
of direct proof of an offer for the purpose of further distribution, and therefore likely that
circumstantial evidence will be necessary to sustain the burden of proof on this point.
36
17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2000).
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range of people. Moreover, frequent or longstanding use of such
peer-to-peer services and the number of works offered could be
relevant as circumstantial evidence, as could statements or
communications by the party making a work available. Log files
or other forensic computer evidence may yield direct or
circumstantial evidence of distribution activity and destruction of
such evidence by a defendant may provide circumstantial evidence
to further other circumstantial evidence established. The particular
circumstances surrounding the creation of a shared folder are also
relevant: did the defendant affirmatively create or place files
within a shared folder or were the contents of the shared folder
something that was the result of default settings or background
operations of the peer-to-peer program itself?37 The circumstances
that could further a circumstantial claim to infringement will likely
vary with the facts, but if courts approach the evidentiary burden
from the perspective of both direct and circumstantial evidence,
precedential guidance could develop.
In combination with circumstantial evidence of distribution,
plaintiffs may seek to establish some evidentiary basis through
direct evidence. In other legal contexts where unlawful activity is
suspected, there has been a role for “stings” and undercover agents

37

This information may be significant since copyright infringement is a strict liability
statutory tort. While secondary liability considers the level of knowledge by the
defendant, liability based on direct infringement does not require knowledge. See
ABKCO Music Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 944 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that
the lack of knowledge or intent to copy is not a defense to infringement). By assessing
circumstantial evidence, scienter enters into the analysis even if it does not provide a
defense to the elements of direct infringement (the case based on circumstantial evidence
is nevertheless one of “direct infringement” even if it is not based on “direct evidence”).
In the case where the software company is the proximate cause of the harm to copyright
owners based on the intentional design of the software, an action against the software
company on the basis of secondary liability may be preferable to a suit for direct liability
against an unwitting user of the software. Traditionally, it was believed that an action for
secondary liability is predicated upon an underlying direct infringement. The reasoning
was that the congressional use of the term “authorize” in § 106 was intended by Congress
to address secondary liability and not direct liability. See Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe
Commc’ns Co., 24 F.3d 1088. 1093 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Consequently, we believe that ‘to
authorize was simply a convenient peg on which Congress chose to hang the antecedent
jurisprudence of third party liability.’”) (quoting 3 DAVID NIMMER & MELVILLE B.
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 12.04[A][3][a], at 12–84 (1993) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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to document what otherwise might be concealed activity.
Entrapment concerns are present, but where the agent is not
enticing a defendant into wrongful activity, but rather simply
duplicating unlawful activity by bad actors, such a sting serves a
legitimate purpose. In the distribution context, there has been the
use of agents by plaintiffs to request copies or phonorecords of
works from entities that were not authorized by the copyright
owner. In the case of Atlantic Recording Corp. v. Howell, the
plaintiffs utilized the services of an agent, MediaSentry, to request
downloads from a peer-to-peer user.38 The use of an agent in this
manner would appear to provide some direct evidence of
distribution. Together with other circumstantial evidence of
distribution, this direct evidence would provide additional value.
It has been argued, however, that “it is axiomatic that a
copyright owner cannot infringe her own copyright. By the same
token, an authorized agent acting on behalf of a copyright owner
also cannot infringe any rights held by that owner.”39 Does the
second proposition follow from the first? May actions by an agent
of a copyright owner provide additional direct and/or
circumstantial evidence to claim of infringement of the distribution
right?
In Olan Mills, Inc.v. Linn Photo, Inc., an agent of Olan Mills
asked Linn Photo to make copies of copyrighted works.40 Linn
Photo provided copies, but its lawyers argued that such
reproductions were “authorized” through the agent by the plaintiff
copyright owner. The district court accepted this theory and held
that Olan Mills had, through its agent, authorized Linn Photo to
make copies of the plaintiff’s copyrighted works.41 The Eighth
Circuit disagreed with this conclusion and stated: “It is wellestablished that the lawful owner of a copyright cannot infringe its
own copyright. Nor can a copyright owner authorize copying but
38

Atl. Recording Corp. v. Howell, No. CV06-02076 (PHX) (NVW), 2007 WL
2409549, at *1 (D. Ariz. Aug. 20, 2007).
39
Brief for Electronic Frontier Foundation as Amicus Curae Opposing Plaintiff’s
Motion for Summary Judgment at 12, Howell, No. CV06-02076 (PHX) (NVW), 2007
WL 2409549 (D. Ariz. Aug. 20. 2007), available at http://www.eff.org/files/filenode/
atlantic_v_howel/EFF_amicus_atlantic_howell.pdf (internal citations omitted).
40
23 F.3d 1345, 1347 (8th Cir. 1994).
41
Id.
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subsequently revoke its consent, thereby entrapping an otherwise
innocent party into infringement. In our view, however, the
licensing theory advanced by Linn Photo is inapplicable.”42
As the Eighth Circuit clarified in a footnote, Olan Mills did not
authorize the investigator to waive its copyright, but rather
authorized its third party agent “to act as if he were a customer
who owned a copy of a copyrighted work.”43 Whether or not the
agent was authorized was irrelevant to the question of Linn Photo’s
authority to engage in infringing acts. The Eighth Circuit found
this view to be consistent with investigative schemes upheld by
other courts.44
The Eighth Circuit explained the agent’s activity as follows:
The investigator in this case merely approached
Linn Photo in a conventional manner and offered
Linn Photo an opportunity to infringe upon four
clearly marked copyrights. Olan Mills did not
authorize the investigator to validate Linn Photo’s
unlawful conduct.
Indeed, the investigator’s
assignment was part of Olan Mills’ attempt to stop
42

Id. at 1348 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at n.1.
44
Id. at 1348 (citing RCA/Ariola Int’l Inc. v. Thomas & Grayston Co., 845 F.2d 773
(8th Cir. 1988); RCA Records v. All-Fast Sys. Inc., 594 F. Supp. 335 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)).
In RCA/Ariola lnt’l, the agents’ activity was described by the court:
Beginning in 1983 and continuing through 1985, the investigators of
the RIAA Anti-Piracy Unit took musical tapes copyrighted by RCA
and the other appellants to the businesses of the various retailers.
The investigators would present a copyrighted tape marked with a P
copyright notice to one of the retailers’ clerks. The investigators
would ask the clerk for the proper length blank tape to copy the
particular copyrighted tape presented. Then the investigator would
feign ignorance of how the Rezound copier worked in order to
persuade the clerk to do as much of the copying as possible. In some
instances the investigators received assistance ranging from putting
the originals in the appropriate slot in the machine to completing the
entire copying process. The deposition of investigator Vaughan
reveals that Vaughan made no effort to observe whether or not any of
the bona fide customers copied copyrighted recordings. In oral
argument, counsel for RCA stated that such an investigation would
have been too time-consuming.
RCA/Ariola Int’l, 845 F.2d at 777.
43
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Linn Photo’s infringement. Accordingly, the copies
made by Linn Photo at the request of the
investigator
were
copyright
violations.45
Thus, while a copyright owner (including a joint owner) may
not infringe his or her own copyright,46 and authorization by such
an owner to another may be interpreted as a license or permission
to engage in an exclusive right, it does not necessarily follow that a
copyright owner’s authorization to an agent extends to another
entity. A copyright owner may indemnify an agent without
granting rights, and thus, an agent would have no authority to
authorize another.47
The fact that a third party receives
indemnification from an agent of the copyright owner is
insufficient to avoid liability.48 Moreover, even in the case of a
licensee, that licensee cannot give more than he or she received.49
If an agent’s authority is limited and the agent’s conduct does not
entrap a third party, the use of an agent to substantiate infringing
activity is consistent with prevailing precedent.50 The agent can
45

Olan Mills, 23 F.3d at 1348.
See, e.g., Cortner v. Israel, 732 F.2d 267, 271 (3d Cir. 1984) (“Infringement is the
violation of an owner’s copyright interest by a non-owner. The purpose of an
infringement suit is to protect the owner’s property interest. It is elementary that the
lawful owner of a copyright is incapable of infringing a copyright interest that is owned
by him; nor can a joint owner of a copyright sue his co-owner for infringement.”)
(internal citations omitted).
47
In many cases an agent doesn’t have clear authority to authorize the infringing act of
a third party. A copyright owner can explicitly limit the scope of the agent’s authority by
merely providing written assurance that the copyright owner will not sue the agent for
direct or indirect acts of copyright infringement in the course of investigating abuses of
the copyright owner’s intellectual property.
48
Olan Mills, 23 F.3d at 1348 (“Linn Photo’s indemnity agreement does not constitute
a good faith effort to avoid copyright infringement. Therefore, Linn Photo cannot rely on
that agreement to avoid statutory liability.”).
49
See Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Cos., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976).
50
A reference in the Nimmer treatise appears to have been interpreted too broadly by
some courts. Nimmer states: “Likewise, it has been held that plaintiff may not claim to
have been damaged by reason of defendant’s sale of infringing copies if the copies were
sold to plaintiff’s agent, because such sale prevented the distribution of such copies to the
general public.” 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 13, at § 14.02. While this may
appear to indicate that an agent’s purchase is not a distribution to the public, on closer
inspection, it becomes clear that this statement is more narrowly focused. The statement
cites Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Bleeker (Shapiro I), 243 F. Supp. 999, 1001 (D. Cal.
1965), aff’d, Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. 4636 S. Vermont Ave., Inc. (Shapiro II), 367
46
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provide evidence of the infringement by third parties51 or the
defendant in a suit.52
The production of evidence of a defendant’s distribution of a
copyrighted work to an agent constitutes direct evidence of
infringement of the work or works distributed to the agent. But
such evidence may also be used as circumstantial evidence of
additional infringement. As one court stated in relation to such
direct evidence: “the evidence establishes a strong inference,
which defendant has done nothing to rebut, that the employees
would and did do exactly the same copying for customers
unconnected with plaintiffs.”53
The production of direct evidence of distribution of a
copyrighted work to an agent by a defendant need not be limited to
direct evidence. Such direct evidence may be circumstantial
evidence of a pattern of distribution of works, and as such a basis
for a broader circumstantial case of distribution of other works. As
with all circumstantial cases, it is the totality of the evidence that
must be assessed. Making a work available is clearly one piece of
circumstantial evidence that may be joined with other links in the
chain of circumstances necessary to prove infringement. The
ultimate question is whether all of the evidence, taken as a whole,
tends to prove that a proposition is more likely than not. The fact
F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1966). That case dealt with the infringement of a book containing
fifty-five copyrighted songs within the book. Shapiro I, 243 F. Supp. at 1000. The
plaintiff argued for damages for twelve works contained in the book. Id. Based on the
price of the book, the court found that not only would the plaintiff be compensated for the
book’s price, but would receive an additional $13,750 over the gross amount received by
the defendant. Id. at 1001. Thus, in context, the Nimmer statement relates to the
appropriate amount of damages when an agent paid for a particular lawful copy (the
copyright owner thereby not being entitled to a recovery based on that copy since the first
sale doctrine would apply). “There is no evidence of any damage to the plaintiff. Indeed,
it is difficult to see how the plaintiff could be damaged by the sale because plaintiff’s
own agent bought the book, and thus prevented the circularization of the copyrighted
material to the public.” Id. The Nimmer quote is thus irrelevant to authorization to
engage in an act that falls within the exclusive rights.
51
Polygram Int’l Publ’g v. Nevada/TIG, Inc., 855 F. Supp. 1314, 1319 (D. Mass.
1994).
52
RCA/Ariola Int’l Inc. v. Thomas & Grayston Co., 845 F.2d 773, 777, 781 (8th Cir.
1988).
53
RCA Records, Div. of RCA Corp. v. All-Fast Sys., Inc., 594 F. Supp. 335, 338
(S.D.N.Y. 1984).
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that a defendant has made works available for distribution, when
assessed together with direct evidence of distribution of some
works in the defendants’ shared drive, creates a factual question of
broader infringement of the distribution right. The presence of
forensic computer evidence, such as log files, or the destruction or
corruption of hardware or software by the defendant, as well as the
timing of such tampering, may lead to additional inferences.54 The
credibility of the defendant or the defendant’s witnesses will also
be a consideration in a circumstantial case.
There is truth in the claim that direct evidence of distribution of
a few works does not lead to the inference that all of the other
works in a shared folder were actually distributed, particularly
given the fact that at any given time there may be over two million
file-sharers on a peer-to-peer network, sharing close to 300 million
files.55 Yet, this argument proves too much. The enormous
54

Log files may be particularly relevant to a case of circumstantial evidence of
distribution. It appears that some peer-to-peer software create log files that may reveal
what particular files were transmitted and the IP address of the recipient. Such forensic
electronic evidence, or the tampering of such evidence, could be important links in the
circumstantial chain. See, e.g., Frank Adelstein and Robert A. Joyce, Fire Marshall:
Automatic Extraction of Peer-to-Peer Data, 4S DIGITAL INVESTIGATION 43 (2007),
available at http://dfrws.org/2007/proceedings/p43-adelstein.pdf.
55
Brief for Electronic Frontier Foundation as Amicus Curae Opposing Plaintiff’s
Motion for Summary Judgment at 13, Atl. Recording Corp. v. Howell, No. CV06-02076
(PHX) (NVW), 2007 WL 2409549 (D. Ariz. Aug. 20, 2007), available at
http://www.eff.org/files/filenode/atlantic_v_howel/EFF_amicus_atlantic_howell.pdf.
The EFF stated:
Nor have Plaintiffs established that MediaSentry’s downloads
constitute circumstantial evidence that the Howell’s computer
disseminated copies of the eleven songs in question to any other
KaZaA user. In fact, Plaintiffs’ own evidence makes this seem
particularly unlikely. According to Plaintiffs’ expert, during the
period that MediaSentry performed its investigation, there were
2,282,954 KaZaA users online, sharing 292,532,420 files. Every one
of the eleven songs at issue came from multi-platinum hit records.
Even accepting Plaintiffs’ hearsay testimony as true, these facts
together suggest that it is highly unlikely that, among the millions of
KaZaA users who are likely to be sharing them at any time, these
eleven songs would have been downloaded from Defendants’
computer. At any instant, KaZaA users are likely to have thousands
of sources for these particular songs to choose from and no reason to
choose the Defendants’ computer over any other. And while
Plaintiffs may be correct that, in the aggregate, KaZaA users engage
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volume of unlawful distributors does not serve to insulate the
defendant from circumstantial liability. While the particular
circumstances are relevant, if a defendant has taken part in a filesharing network for any sustained period of time, this sheer
volume may easily lead to an inference that it is more likely than
not that, at some time, the files were in fact distributed. That is, in
fact, the primary advantage of circumstantial evidence of
distribution—there need not be direct evidence of the direct
infringement. All that is necessary to prove direct infringement is
that there is a reasonable likelihood that direct infringement
occurred—that it is more likely than not. The circumstantial
evidence can be further narrowed by determining how many users
were distributing the particular works at issue during a given
period. Such evidence may reduce the ratio in order to support an
inference. In those cases where a higher number of users are
sharing particular works, i.e., the most popular works, those works
could be the focus of the direct evidence by agents of the copyright
owner.56 While any such inferences are rebuttable, the credibility
of witnesses and the development of additional threads of
circumstantial proof of distribution can be proffered.57

in a prodigious amount of infringing activity, that general statement
tells us nothing about the crucial issue in this case: whether these
Defendants transmitted (i.e., uploaded) any of these eleven songs
during the time period in question. Plaintiffs evidence simply cannot
bridge the chasm between ‘making available’ and ‘actual
dissemination’ to anyone other than Plaintiffs’ authorized agents.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
56
It may also be noted that in addition to direct and circumstantial evidence of
distribution, the copyright owner attempting to combat unlawful distribution of
copyrighted works may also allege a case for contributory infringement of the
reproduction right. See, e.g., MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. 545 U.S. 913, 929–30
(2005). The direct evidence of the distribution of unauthorized copyrighted works on a
peer-to-peer network will very likely support a claim that the defendant knowingly and
materially contributed to the unauthorized reproduction of works by third parties, as
demonstrated by the agents’ reproduction. Such a claim would extend to every work
downloaded by the agents.
57
As discussed supra in the text accompanying footnote 37, the use of agents and
forensic computer evidence could transform a weak circumstantial case into a compelling
totality of reasonably likely inferences. A circumstantial case does not rest on any one
inference, but rather on the combination of circumstances that tend to prove that an event
was more likely than not.
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Circumstantial evidence is not a panacea for the dramatic
problem of infringement over peer-to-peer networks, but it,
together with direct evidence and secondary liability, can be
utilized in a situation where “making available” or mere
“authorization” are incapable of supporting a claim for direct
infringement. Even though the nature of proof for circumstantial
evidence for the distribution right has not undergone the same level
of development that circumstantial evidence for the reproduction
right has achieved, the circumstances which gave rise to the latter
are now present for the distribution right. Circumstantial evidence
is an essential tool in all forms of litigation. It provides avenues of
proof to effectively protect a right where direct evidence is lacking
or unavailable. Moreover, to the extent that U.S. copyright law
encompasses circumstantial evidence of distribution, there is an
unassailable argument that the United States fulfills its treaty
obligations regarding “making available” through the penumbra of
U.S. legal doctrines and jurisprudence. It is essential that the law
in this area be developed in order to provide reasonable and
effective protection for the rights of copyright owners.

